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Abstract
According to an “external grounding” theory of meaning, a concept’s meaning depends on its
connection to the external world. By a “conceptual web” account, a concept’s meaning depends on
its relations to other concepts within the same system. We explore one aspect of meaning, the
identiﬁcation of matching concepts across systems (e.g. people, theories, or cultures). We present
a computational algorithm called ABSURDIST (Aligning Between Systems Using Relations
Derived Inside Systems for Translation) that uses only within-system similarity relations to ﬁnd
between-system translations. While illustrating the sufﬁciency of a conceptual web account for
translating between systems, simulations of ABSURDIST also indicate powerful synergistic inter-
actions between intrinsic, within-system information and extrinsic information. q 2002 Elsevier
Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
“Mr. Martin: I have a little girl, my little daughter, she lives with me, dear lady. She is
two years old, has a white eye and a red eye, she is very pretty, and her name is Alice,
dear lady.
Mrs. Martin: What a bizarre coincidence! I, too, have a little girl. She is two years old,
has a white eye and a red eye, she is very pretty, and her name is Alice, too, dear sir!
Mr. Martin: How curious it is and what a coincidence! And bizarre! Perhaps they are the
same, dear lady!”
Eugene Ionesco (1958), “The Bald Soprano”
What gives our concepts their meaning? There have been two major answers to this
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E-mail address: rgoldsto@indiana.edu (R.L. Goldstone).question. The ﬁrst answer is that concepts’ meanings depend on their connection to the
external world. By this account, the concept Dog means what it does because of its causal
connection to dogs in the world. Perceptual processes are critical to this account in that
they mediate between the external and internal worlds. Dog is characterized by features
that are either perceptually given, or can be reduced to features that are perceptually given.
This will be called the “external grounding” account of conceptual meaning. The second
answer is that concepts’ meanings depend on their connections to each other. By this
account, Dog’s meaning depends on Cat, Domesticated, and Loyal, and in turn, these
concepts depend on other concepts, including Dog. The dominating metaphor here is of a
conceptual web in which concepts all mutually inﬂuence each other (Quine & Ullian,
1970). A concept can mean something within a network of other concepts but not by itself,
similar to how stability may be a property of a thread within a web but not any thread taken
in isolation. This will be called the “conceptual web” account.
Some researchers ﬁnd the notion of a network of concepts wherein each concept char-
acterizes, and is characterized by, the others as viciously circular. Others embrace the
prospect, acknowledging its circularity, but diagnosing it as benign rather than vicious.
The agenda of the present paper is three-fold. First, we will provide a brief and partial
survey of the motivations for these contrasting perspectives on conceptual meaning.
Second, we will focus on one argument against the conceptual web account. According
to this argument, the conceptual web accountcannot explain howtwopeople can be said to
possess the same concept if they have even slightly different conceptual systems. Third,
we will present a computational algorithm that is able to ﬁnd corresponding concepts
across people or systems solely on the basis of relations between concepts within a person
or system. A quantitative assessment of the algorithm will evaluate the robustness of the
algorithm and its sensitivity to various parameters governing a conceptual network.
Although the mere presence of the algorithm might be taken as evidence in favor of the
conceptual web account, a closer examination of the algorithm’s performance reveals
important interactions between internal and external characterizations of a concept.
Given these interactions, our ﬁnal conclusion will be that the conceptual web and external
grounding accounts of meaning are not only compatible with each other, but that they
strengthen one another.
2. The conceptual web
The notion that the meaning of a concept depends on the other concepts within a system
has been highly inﬂuential in all of the major ﬁelds that comprise cognitive science:
linguistics, computer science, psychology, and philosophy. Representative theories in
each of these ﬁelds will be described, although many other candidates could have easily
been chosen.
In a standard linguistic treatment of concepts, concepts are deﬁned or characterized in
terms of other concepts. Ferdinand de Saussure (1915/1959) argued that all concepts are
completely “negatively deﬁned”, that is, deﬁned solely in terms of other concepts. He
contended that “language is a system of interdependent terms in which the value of each
term results solely from the simultaneous presence of the others” (p. 114) and that
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negatively by their relations with other terms in the system” (p. 117). By this account, the
meaning of Mutton is deﬁned in terms of other neighboring concepts. Mutton’s use does
not extend to cover sheep that are living because there is another lexicalized concept to
cover living sheep (Sheep), and Mutton does not extend to cover cooked pig because of
the presence of Pork. Under this notion of interrelated concepts, concepts compete for the
right to control particular regions of a conceptual space. If the word mutton did not exist,
then “all its content would go to its competitors” (Saussure, 1915/1959, p. 116).
According to the conceptual role semantics theory in philosophy, the meaning of a
concept is given by its role within its containing system (Block, 1986, 1999; Field,
1977; Rapaport, 2002). A conceptual belief, for example, that dogs bark, is identiﬁed
by its unique causal role in the mental economy of the organism in which it is contained.
A system containing only a single concept is not possible (Stich, 1983). A common
inference from this view is that concepts that belong to substantially different systems
must have different meanings. This inference, called “translation holism” by Fodor and
Lepore (1992), entails that a person cannot have the same concept as another person unless
the rest of their conceptual systems are at least highly similar. This view has had perhaps
the most impact in the philosophy of science, where Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis
states that there can be no translation between scientiﬁc concepts across scientists that are
committed to fundamentally different ontologies (Kuhn, 1962). A chemist indoctrinated
into Lavoisier’s theory of oxygen cannot translate any of their concepts toearlier chemists’
concept of phlogiston. A more recent chemist can only entertain the earlier phlogiston
concept by absorbing the entire pre-Lavoisier theory, not by trying to insert the single
phlogiston concept into their more recent theory or by ﬁnding an equivalent concept in
their theory.
In psychology, researchers have argued that concepts are frequently characterized by
their associative relations to other concepts. Barr and Caplan (1987) provide evidence, by
having subjects list features associated with words, that many concepts are characterized
by what they call “extrinsic features”, features that are “represented as the relationship
between two or more entities” (p. 398).
1 An extrinsic feature of Hammer is that it is “used
to strike nails”. This feature makes recourse to an object other than hammer. If this feature
is part of one’s natural concept of Hammer, then one cannot possess Hammer without
also possessing Nail. Goldstone (1993, 1996) presented empirical evidence that concepts
are often interrelated in the sense that each simultaneously acquired concept not only
inﬂuences how often each concept is used as a label for a presented stimulus, but also
inﬂuences the absolute representation of each concept. In particular, when two concepts
are highly interrelated (e.g. when they are presented in close temporal proximity to each
other, or when their labels are similar), there is a tendency for people to create representa-
tions of the concepts that are systematically distorted away from each other. This is
accomplished by de-emphasizing features that are possessed by both concepts, and by
encoding caricatured rather than veridical dimension values for the concepts (see also
Goldstone, 1995).
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1 We will use the term “extrinsic” to refer to the dependency of a concept on information outside of the system
of concepts, rather than Barr and Caplan’s use of the term to refer to inter-conceptual dependencies.Finally, in computer science, semantic networks have been a major approach to knowl-
edge representation. In these networks, concepts are represented by nodes in a network,
and gain their functionality by their links to other concept nodes (Collins & Loftus, 1975;
Quillian, 1967). Often times, these links are labeled, in which case different links refer to
different kinds of relations between nodes. Dog would be connected to Animal by an Is-a
link, to Bone by an Eats link, and to Paw by a Has-a link. Lenat and Feigenbaum (1991)
have argued that inter-conceptual linkages are sufﬁcient for establishing conceptual mean-
ings even without any external grounding of the concepts: “The problem of ‘genuine
semantics’…gets easier, not harder, as the K[nowledge] B[ase] grows. In the case of
an enormous KB, such as CYC’s, for example, we could rename all of the frames and
predicates as G001, G002, …, and – using our knowledge of the world – reconstruct what
each of their names must be.” (p. 236). A computational approach to word meaning that
has received considerable recent attention has been to base word meanings solely on the
patterns of co-occurrence between a large number of words in an extremely large text
corpus (Burgess, Livesay, & Lund, 1998; Burgess & Lund, 2000; Landauer & Dumais,
1997). Mathematical techniques are used to create vector encodings of words that efﬁ-
ciently capture their co-occurrences. If two words, such as “cocoon” and “butterﬂy”
frequently co-occur in an encyclopedia or enter into similar patterns of co-occurrence
with other words, then their vector representations will be highly similar. The meaningof a
word, its vector in a high dimensional space, is completely based on the contextual
similarity of the word to other words.
A claim common to these brieﬂy considered theories in linguistics, philosophy,
psychology, and computer science is that concepts can only be understood once an entire
system of interrelated concepts has been acquired. The concept Strike from baseball
depends on concepts such as Batter, Ball, Strike Zone, and Swing, and these concepts
themselves depend on other baseball concepts. Understanding a psychologist’s notion of a
Conditioned Response is possible only after a theory of stimulus–response association is
learned. Until then, the deﬁnition “a conditioned response is behavior that is elicited when
a neutral cue is presented that has been paired with a positive or negative reinforcer” will
be of little help in teaching the concept.
3. Externally grounded concepts
Although the notion that concepts gain their meaningbytheir relations to other concepts
has been popular in cognitive science, it is not without its detractors. Some have argued
that the role of a concept within a network is insufﬁcient to establish its meaning. The
concept must be somehow connected to the external world, and this external connection
establishes at least part of the meaning of the concept. In his article “The symbol ground-
ing problem”, Stevan Harnad (1990) considers the following thought experiment:
Suppose you had to learn Chinese as a ﬁrst language and the only source of informa-
tion you had was a Chinese/Chinese dictionary. […]. How can you ever get off the
symbol/symbol merry-go-round? How is symbol meaning to be grounded in some-
thing other than just more meaningless symbols? This is the symbol grounding
problem. (pp. 339–340)
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precedents in philosophy. As part of the British empiricist movement, David Hume (1740/
1973) argued that our conceptual ideas originate in recombinations of sensory impres-
sions. John Locke (1690) believed that our concepts (“ideas”) have their origin either by
our sense organs or by an internal sense of reﬂection. He argues further that our original
ideas are derived from sensations (e.g. yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, and hard), and that
the remaining ideas are derived from or depend upon these original ideas. Viewing sensory
information as the ultimate ground for our concepts and beliefs is commonplace in philo-
sophy. For example, Quine and Ullian (1970) argue “Thus the ultimate evidence that our
whole system of beliefs has to answer up to consists strictly of our own direct observations
– including our observations of our notes and of other people’s reports” (p. 21).
In psychology, the importance of conceptual meanings that are grounded in something
other than other concepts has recently manifested itself in a call for perceptually-based
concepts. In the Barsalou’s (1999) theory of perceptual symbol systems, concepts are not
amodal, completely abstracted symbols, but rather are intrinsically perceptually based. He
ﬁnds that detailed perceptual information is represented in concepts and that this informa-
tion is used when reasoning about those concepts. Goldstone and Barsalou (1998) argue
for strong parallels between processes traditionally considered to be perceptual on the one
hand and conceptual on the other, and that perceptual processes are co-opted by abstract
conceptual thought. This research, together with research on the bi-directional inﬂuences
between our concepts and perceptions (Goldstone, Steyvers, Spencer-Smith, & Kersten,
2000; Schyns, Goldstone, & Thibaut, 1998), suggests that apparently high-level concep-
tual knowledge and low-level perception may be more closely related than traditionally
thought.
In computer science, there is a growing interest in conceptual systems that are grounded
in embodied systems (Brooks, 1991). Researchers in robotics and artiﬁcial life have
argued that the concepts that an agent learns should be grounded in the agent’s perceptual
and motor systems (Almasi & Sporns, 2001). By embodying a neural architecture in a real
device, the capabilities and adaptability of the system are augmented. Part of the rationale
for the embodied systems research program seems to be a mistrust with purely symbolic
representations that are disconnected from the physical environment and the organism’s
bodily affordances.
Thus far, we have used externally grounded concepts to mean those that are connected
to the world via our senses. However, there is a second, philosophical use of external
meaning to refer to meaning that is causally connected to the external world without
necessarily being mediated through the senses. In this tradition, both the perceptual and
conceptual components to meaning would be considered internal because they are
centered in a single person rather than world (Block, 1986; Miller & Johnson-Laird,
1976). The famous Putnam (1973) “twin earth” thought experiment is designed to show
how the same internal, mental content can be associated with two different external
referents. Putnam has us imagine a world, twin earth, that is exactly like our earth except
that the compound we call water (H2O) has a different atomic structure (xyz), while still
looking, feeling, and acting like water as we on real earth know it. Two molecule-for-
moleculeidentical individuals, one on earth and one on twinearth, wouldpresumablyhave
the same internal mental state when thinking “water is wet”, and yet, Putnam argues, they
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made up of H2O, while the other means stuff that is made up of xyz. Putnam concludes that
what is meant by a term is not determined solely by mental states, but rather depends upon
the external world as well.
The difference between these two interpretations of “external” thus hinges on whether
perceptual components are considered to be within or outside the boundary of the internal
system. A convincing argument has been made for a graded rather than clear-cut boundary
around a system because the same device can be interpreted as being part of an organism’s
perceptual system or as a transducer external to the system (Clark & Chalmers, 1998).
Consistent with this desire to dissolve the boundary around a system, Harman (1987) has
proposed a conceptual role semantics account in which the role that a concept plays is
construed widely to include its relations to external objects as well as its relations to other
concepts. In the following discussion, we will interpret external grounding to refer to any
component of conceptual meaning that does not depend on other concepts. This deﬁnition
coincides with our modeling work in which external grounding will be instantiated as any
source of information that is external to the conceptual web, and may include perceptual
processes, labels, or teacher signals. In adopting this narrower construal of external
grounding, we remain silent on whether or how the world could causally connect to our
conceptual systems in a manner not reducible to its impact as mediated through our
perceptual and motor systems.
4. Translation across conceptual systems
The goal of this article is to argue for the synergistic integration of conceptual web and
externally grounded accounts of conceptual meaning. However, in pursuing this argument,
we will ﬁrst argue for the sufﬁciency of the conceptual web account for a particular task
associated with conceptual meaning. Then, we will show how the conceptual web account
can be ably supplemented by external grounding to establish meanings more successfully
than either method could by itself.
Our point of departure for exploring conceptual meaning will be a highly idealized and
purposefully simpliﬁed version of a conceptual translation task. Consider two individuals,
Joan and John, who each possesses a number of concepts. Suppose further that we would
like some way to tell that Joan and John both have a concept of, say, Mushroom. Joan and
John may not have exactly the same concept of Mushroom. John may believe mushrooms
grow from seeds whereas Joan believes they grow from spores. More generally, Joan and
John will differ in the rest of their conceptual networks because of their different experi-
ences and levels of expertise. Still, it seems desirable to say that Joan’s and John’s Mush-
room concepts correspond to one another. We will describe a network that translates
between concepts in two systems, placing, for example, Joan’s and John’s Mushroom
concepts in correspondence with each other.
Translation across systems is generally desirable and speciﬁcally necessary in order to
say things like “John’s concept of mushrooms is less informed than Joan’s”. The existence
of this kind of translation has been taken as a challenge to conceptual web accounts of
meaning. Fodor and Lepore (1992) offer an extended critical examination of “translation
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unless it belongs to a system containing many concepts that are translations of many
concepts of L. To take the Kuhn (1962) example, translation holism asserts the impossi-
bility that Lavoisier’s notion of oxygen can translate into a pre-Lavoisier chemistry simply
by creating a corresponding term in the pre-Lavoisier chemistry. The only way for oxygen
to have a corresponding concept would be to generate many terms in this pre-Lavoisier
chemistry that correspond to concepts in Lavoisier’s chemistry.
Cross-system translation’s challenge to conceptual web accounts, by Fodor and
Lepore’s interpretation, is that if a concept’s meaning depends on its role within the larger
system, and if there are some differences between the systems, then the meanings of the
concepts in the two systems would be different. They write:
But now suppose that holism is true about thought content. Then, since you and I
surely have widely different belief systems (think of all the things you know that I
don’t) and since, by deﬁnition, a property is holistic only if nothing has it unless
many other things do, it may well turn out that none of your thought has the property
of bearing T* to any of mine. [T* is the property which a belief has if and only if it
expresses a proposition that is the content of some belief of mine]. It would follow
that that not more than one of us ever has thoughts about color or thoughts about red.
(p. 14)
We are left in the position of not being able to tell that Joan’s and John’s Mushroom
concepts correspond to each other. This result is bad enough when considering the two
systems to be different people or different scientiﬁc theories, but is devastating when one
considers the two systems to be the same person at two different times.
A natural way to try to salvage the conceptual web account is to argue that determining
corresponding concepts across systems does not require the systems to be identical, but
only similar. However, Fodor (Fodor, 1998; Fodor & Lepore, 1992) insists that the notion
of similarity is not adequate to establish that Joan and John both possess a Mushroom
concept. Fodor (1998) considers a situation where you and I have some shared beliefs
about GW (George Washington), but some different beliefs as well:
The similarity of our GW concepts is thus some (presumably weighted) function of
the number of propositions about him that we both believe […] But the question now
arises: what about the shared beliefs themselves; are they or aren’t they literally
shared? This poses a dilemma for the similarity theorist that is, as far as I can see,
unavoidable. If he says that our agreed upon beliefs about GW are literally shared,
then he hasn’t managed to do what he promised; viz. introduce a notion of similarity
of content that dispenses with a robust notion of publicity [a notion that requires
identity of beliefs]. But if he says that the agreed beliefs aren’t literally shared (viz.
that they are only required to be similar), then his account of content similarity begs
the very question it was supposed to answer: his way of saying what it is for concepts
to have similar, but not identical contents presupposes a prior notion of beliefs with
similar but not identical concepts. (pp. 31–32)
Fodor (1998) goes on to argue that all approaches in cognitive science that attempt to
determine identical concepts across individuals by measuring conceptual similarities are
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people’s concept of bachelor may vary in similarity depending on how many features they
have in common. However, Fodor argues that identity of features is required of this
account in order to determine how many features two person’s concepts share. Again,
the claim is that conceptual similarity in fact assumes a notion of identity. This identity
problem also holds for multidimensional scaling notions of similarity, and for similarity in
terms of strength of beliefs. In situations where conceptual similarity appears to explain
how concepts are placed in correspondence across people “it really does seem to be
identity of belief content that’s needed here. If our respective beliefs […] were supposed
to be merely similar, circularity would ensue: since content similarity is the notion we are
trying to explicate, it mustn’t be among the notions that the explication presupposed (I
think I may have mentioned that before)” (p. 33).
We will now present a simple neural network called ABSURDIST (Aligning Between
Systems Using Relations Derived Inside Systems for Translation) that ﬁnds conceptual
correspondences across two systems (two people, two time slices of one person, two
scientiﬁc theories, two cultures, two developmental age groups, two language commu-
nities, etc.) using only inter-conceptual similarities, not conceptual identities, as input.
Laakso and Cottrell (1998, 2000) describe another neural network model that uses simi-
larity relations within two systems to compare the similarity of the systems. ABSURDIST
will take as input two systems of concepts in which every concept of a system is deﬁned
exclusively in terms of its dissimilarities to other concepts in the same system. ABSUR-
DIST produces as output a set of correspondences indicating which concepts from System
A correspond to which concepts from System B. These correspondences serve as the basis
for understanding how the systems can communicate with each other without the assump-
tion made by Fodor (1998) that the two systems have exactly the same concepts. Fodor
argues that any account of concepts should explain their “publicity”–the notion that the
same concept can be possessed by more than one person. Instead, we will advocate a
notion of “correspondence”. An account of concepts should explain how concepts
possessed by different people can correspond to one another, even if the concepts do
not have exactly the same content. The notion of corresponding concepts is less restrictive
than the notion of identical concepts, but is still sufﬁcient to explain how people can share
a conversational ground, and how a single person’s concepts can persist across time
despite changes in the person’s knowledge. While less restrictive than the notion of
concept identity, the notion of correspondence is stronger than the notion of concept
similarity. John’s alligator concept may be similar to Joan’s crocodile concept, but the
two do not correspond because John’s crocodile concept is even more similar in terms of
its role within the conceptual system. Two concepts correspond to each other if they play
equivalent roles within their systems, and ABSURDIST provides a formal method for
determining equivalence of roles.
The existence of ABSURDIST provides evidence against Fodor’s argument that simi-
larities between people’s concepts are an insufﬁcient basis for determining that two people
share an equivalent concept. Moreover, the network also explores the larger issue of
whether conceptual meanings can be determined solely on the basis of inter-conceptual
similarity relations. To avoid potential misunderstandings, four disclaimers are in order
before we describe the algorithm.
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connect these concepts to the external world. The algorithm can reveal that Joan’s mush-
room concept corresponds to John’s mushroom concept, but the basic algorithm does not
reveal what in the external world corresponds to these concepts. However, an interesting
extension of ABSURDIST would be to ﬁnd correspondences between concepts within an
internal system and physically measurable elements of an external system.
Second, our intention is not to create a rich or realistic model of translation across
systems. In fact, our intention is to explore the simplest, most impoverished representation
of concepts and their interrelations that is possible. If such a representation sufﬁces to
determine cross-system translations, then richer representations would presumably fare
even better. To this end, we will not represent concepts as structured lists of dimension
values, features or attribute/value frames, and we will not consider different kinds of
relations between concepts such as Is-a, Has-a, Part-of, Used-for,o rCauses. Concepts
are simply elements that are related to other concepts within their system by a single,
generic similarity relation. The speciﬁc input that ABSURDIST takes will be two two-
dimensional proximity matrices, one for each system. Each matrix indicates the similarity
of every concept within a system to every other concept in the system. While an indivi-
dual’s concepts certainly relate to each other in manyways (Medin, Goldstone, & Gentner,
1990, 1993), using many kinds of similarity (Goldstone, 1994a), our present point is that
even if the only relation between concepts in a system were generic similarity, this would
sufﬁce to ﬁnd translations of the concept in different systems.
The third disclaimer is that ABSURDIST is hardly a complete model of conceptual
meaning. The intention of the model is simply to show how one task related to conceptual
meaning, ﬁnding corresponding concepts across two systems, can be solved using only
within-system similarities between concepts. It is relevant to the general issue of concep-
tual meaning given the arguments in the literature (e.g. Fodor, 1998) that this kind of
within-system similarity is insufﬁcient to identify cross-system matching concepts.
However, simply determining that concepts are equivalent across systems does not tell
us what the concepts mean, as is made abundantly clear by the intentionally impoverished
conceptual representations of ABSURDIST.
Fourth, our intention is not to describe a human simulation of translation, conceptual
alignment, or analogy (e.g. Falkenhainer, Forbus, & Gentner, 1989; Hofstadter, 1995;
Hummel & Holyoak, 1997). ABSURDIST ﬁnds correspondences between concepts across
systems, and would not typically be housed in any one of the systems. The exception to
this would be if a system was interested in ﬁnding translations between entities in two
distinct subsystems within it. In this case, the algorithm could be considered a model of
human conceptual alignment, albeit one that uses a much simpler representation than the
models cited above. In other simulations of human conceptual alignment, such as SME
(Falkenhainer et al., 1989), SIAM (Goldstone, 1994b), LISA (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997),
Drama (Eliasmith & Thagard, 2001), and ACME (Holyoak & Thagard, 1989), the
concepts themselves are richly structured in terms of hierarchical feature sets, proposi-
tions, or attribute/value sets. From this perspective, ABSURDIST may apply when these
other models cannot, in domains where explicit structural descriptions are not available,
but simple similarity relations are available. For example, a German–English bilingual
could probably provide subjective similarity ratings of words within the set {Cat, Dog,
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{Katze, Hund, Lo ¨we, Hai, Schildkro ¨te}. These similarities would provide the input needed
by ABSURDIST to determine that “Cat” corresponds to “Katze”. However, the same
bilingual might not be able to provide the kind of analytic and structured representation
of “Cat” that the other models require. Apart from this practical beneﬁt, the theoretical
contribution of ABSURDIST is to show that it is possible to ﬁnd correspondences across
systems even when the entities within a system are completely deﬁned by their relations to
other entities within the same system. With the SME, SIAM, LISA, and ACME systems,
the representations of concepts include both relations to other concepts within the domain
and stand-alone properties.
If the primary interpretation of ABSURDIST is not as a computational model of a single
human’s cognition, then what is it? It is an algorithm that demonstrates the available
information that could be used to ﬁnd translations between systems. The argument will
be that even systems with strictly internal relations among their parts possess the informa-
tion necessary for an observer to translate between them.
5. The ABSURDIST algorithm
Elements A1,…m belong to System A, while elements B1,…n belong to System B. Ct(Aq,Bx)
is the activation, at time t, of the unit that represents the correspondence between the qth
element of A and the xth element of B. There will be m £ n correspondence units, one for
each possible pair of corresponding elements between A and B. In the current example,
every element represents one concept in a system. The activation of a correspondence unit
is bound between 0 and 1, with a value of 1 indicating a strong correspondence between
the associated elements, and a value of 0 indicating strong evidence that the elements do
not correspond. Correspondence units dynamically evolve over time by the equations:
if NðCtðAq;BxÞÞ $ 0 then Ct11ðAq;BxÞ¼CtðAq;BxÞ 1 NðCtðAq;BxÞÞðmax 2 CtðAq;BxÞÞL
else Ct11ðAq;BxÞ¼CtðAq;BxÞ 1 NðCtðAq;BxÞÞðCtðAq;BxÞ 2 minÞL (1)
If N(Ct(Aq,Bx)), the net input to a unit that links the qth element of A and the xth element of
B, is positive, then the unit’s activation will increase as a function of the net input, a
squashing function that limits activation to an upper bound of max ¼ 1, and a learning rate
L (set to 1). If the net input is negative, then activations are limited by a lower bound of
min ¼ 0. The net input is deﬁned as
NðCt;Aq;BxÞ¼aEðAq;BxÞ 1 bRðAq;BxÞ 2 xIðAq;BxÞð 2Þ
where the E term is the external similarity between Aq and Bx, R is their internal similarity,
I is the inhibition to placing Aq and Bx into correspondence that is supplied by other
developing correspondence units, and a 1 b 1 x ¼ 1. When a ¼ 0, then correspondences
between A and B will be based solely on the similarities among the elements within a
system, as proposed by a conceptual web account.
The amount of excitation to a unit based on within-domain relations is given by
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X m
r¼1
r–q
X n
y¼1
y–x
SðDðAq;ArÞ;DðBx;ByÞÞCtðAr;ByÞ
minðm;nÞ 2 1
where D(Aq,Ar) is the psychological distance between elements q and r in System A, and
S(E,F) is the similarity between distances E and F, and is deﬁned as
SðE;FÞ¼e
2 E2F jj
The amount of inhibition is given by
IðAq;BxÞ¼
X m
r¼1
r–q
CtðAr;BxÞ 1
X n
y¼1
y–x
CtðAq;ByÞ
m 1 n 2 2
These equations instantiate a fairly standard constraint satisfaction network, with one
twist. According to the equation for R, elements q and x will tend to be placed into
correspondence to the extent that they enter into similar similarity relations with other
elements. For example, in Fig. 1, q has a distance of 7 to one element (r) and a distance of 9
to another element (s) within its System A. These are similar to the distances that x has to
the other elements in System B, and accordingly there should be a tendency to place q in
correspondence with x. Some similarity relations should count much more than others.
The similarity between D(Aq,Ar) and D(Bx,By) should matter more than the similarity
between D(Aq,Ar) and D(Bx,Bz) in terms of strengthening the correspondence between q
and x, because Ar corresponds to By not to Bz. This is achieved by weighting the similarity
between two distances by the strength of the units that align elements that are placed in
correspondence by the distances. As the network begins to place Ar into correspondence
with By, the similarity between D(Aq,Ar) and D(Bx,By) becomes emphasized as a basis for
placing Aq into correspondence with Bx. As such, the equation for R represents the sum of
the supporting evidence (the consistent correspondences), with each piece of support
weighted by its relevance (given by the similarity term). This sum is normalized by
dividing it by the minimum of (m 2 1) and (n 2 1). This minimum is the number of
terms that will contribute to the R term if only one-to-one correspondences exist between
systems.
The inhibitory I term is based on a one-to-one mapping constraint (Falkenhainer et al.,
1989; Holyoak & Thagard, 1989). The unit that places Aq into correspondence with Bx will
tend to become deactivated if other strongly activated units place Aq into correspondence
with other elements from B,o rBx into correspondence with other elements from A.
Correspondence unit activations are initialized to random values selected from a normal
distributionwithameanof0.5andastandarddeviationof0.05.Inoursimulations,Eq.(1)is
iterated for a ﬁxed number of cycles. It is assumed that ABSURDIST places two elements
into correspondencesifthe activation oftheir correspondence unit isgreater than 0.55 after
the ﬁxed number of iterations have been completed. Thus, the network gives as output a
complete set of proposed correspondences/translations between Systems A and B.
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The general form of the ABSURDIST model presented above does not constrain rela-
tions between elements within a system, the D(x,y) values. The network takes two dissim-
ilarity matrices as input, and the elements of these matrices can assume any non-negative
values. However, in assessing ABSURDIST’s performance, it will be helpful to assume
that the conceptual dissimilarities obey metric assumptions, and are interpretable as
distances between concepts lying in a geometric space. Our general method for evaluating
ABSURDIST will be to generate a number of elements in an N-dimensional space, with
each element identiﬁed by its value on each of the N dimensions. These will be the
elements of System A, and each is represented as a point in space. Then, System B’s
elements are created by copying the points from System A and adding Gaussian noise with
a mean of 0 to each of the dimension values of each of the points. The motivation for
distorting A’s points to generate B’s points is to model the common phenomenon that
people’s concepts are not identical, and are not identically related to one another. The
distances between every pair of elements within a system are computed by
Dðx;yÞ¼
"
X N
n¼1
     Vn;x 2 Vn;y
     
r# 1
r
where Vn,x is the value of element x on dimension n, and r is a parameter that speciﬁes the
kind of Minkowski distance metric used (r ¼ 1 for City-block distance, r ¼ 2 for Eucli-
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Fig. 1. An example of the input to ABSURDIST. Two systems, A and B, are each represented solely in terms of
the distances/dissimilarities between elements within a system. The correct output from ABSURDIST would be a
cross-system translation in which element q was placed in correspondence with x, r with y, and s with z. Arcs are
labeled with the distances between the elements connected by the arcs.dean). Then, Eq. (1) is used to update correspondences across the two systems for a ﬁxed
number of iterations. The correspondences computed by ABSURDIST are then compared
to the correct correspondences. Two elements correctly correspond to each other if the
element in System B was originally copied from the element in System A.
6.1. Tolerance to distortion
An initial set of simulations was conducted to determine how robust the ABSURDIST
algorithm was to noise and how well the algorithm scaled to different sized systems. As
such,werana7 £ 6factorialcombinationofsimulations,with7levelsofaddednoiseand6
different numbers of elements per system. Noise was infused into the algorithm by varying
the displacement between corresponding points across systems. The points in System A
weresetbyrandomlyselectingdimensionvaluesfromauniformrandomdistributionwitha
rangefrom0to1000.SystemBpointswerecopiedfromSystemA,andGaussiannoisewith
standarddeviationsof0,0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4,or0.5%wasaddedtothepointsofB.Thenumber
of points per system was 3, 4, 5, 6, 10, or 15. Correspondences were computed after 4000
iterations of Eq. (1). The Minkowski r value was set to 2. a was set to 0 (no external
information was used to determine correspondences), b was set to 0.4, and x was set to
0.6.Thevaluesforb andx wereselectedbecausetheywerethemostbalancedweightsthat
produced fewer than 5% two-to-one correspondences. For each of the 30 combinations of
noise and number of items, 1000 separate randomized starting conﬁgurations were tested.
The results from this simulation are shown in Fig. 2, which plots the percentage of simula-
tions in which each of the proper correspondences between systems is recovered. For
example, for 15-item systems, the ﬁgure plots the percentage of time that all 15 correspon-
dences are recovered. The graph showsthat performance gradually deteriorates with added
noise, but that the algorithm is robust to at least modest amounts of noise.
More surprisingly, Fig. 2 also shows that the algorithm’s ability to recover true
correspondences generally increases as a function of the number of elements in each
system, at least for small levels of noise. One might have thought that as more elements
were matched between systems there would be greater confusion between elements,
given that the size of the bounding region remains constant. In fact, at a noise level
where the probability of correctly translating all elements for three-element systems is
less than 50% (noise ¼ 0:3%), completely correct translations for ﬁve-element and 15-
element systems are found 74 and 92% of the time, respectively. The reason for this is
that as the number of elements in a system increases, the similarity relations between
those elements provide increasingly strong constraints that serve to uniquely identify
each element. In the same way that more reliable multidimensional scaling solutions are
found as the number of related points increases, so does the ability to identify a point on
the basis of its relations to other points in the same system. The advantage of ﬁnding
translations as the number of points in a system increases is all the more impressive
when one considers chance performance. If one generated random translations that were
constrained to allow only one-to-one correspondences, then the probability of generating
a completely correct translation would be 1/N!. Thus, with 0.6% noise, the 23% rate of
recovering all three correspondences for a three-item system is slightly above chance
performance of 16.67%. However, with the same amount of noise, the 17% rate of
R.L. Goldstone, B.J. Rogosky / Cognition 84 (2002) 295–320 307recovering all of the correspondences for a 15-item system is remarkably higher than the
chance rate of 7.6 £ 10
213. Thus, at least in our highly simpliﬁed domain, we have
support for the argument of Lenat and Feigenbaum (1991) that establishing meanings
on the basis of within-system relations becomes easier, not harder, as the size of the
system increases.
The measure of translation accuracy shown in Fig. 2 is a conservative measure of
performance because properly aligning 14 out of 15 items, for example, would be
counted as a failure rather than success. Fig. 3 provides more detailed information on
the distribution of partially correct and fully correct alignments. Fig. 3 graphs the
frequency, over the 1000 tests, of obtaining a given percentage of correct correspon-
dences for different items. This graph reveals that partially correct translations are rarely
obtained. With relatively few exceptions, either ABSURDIST ﬁnds all of the correct
correspondences, or ﬁnds none. The reason why 0% of correspondences are found more
frequently than would be predicted by chance responding is that on these trials no cross-
system correspondence receives activation above 0.55. Fig. 3 indicates that if some
concepts are correctly translated, then all concepts are likely to be correctly translated.
This is, once again, due to the cooperative, synergistic nature of the algorithm for
determining correspondences.
In evaluating the efﬁciency of the algorithm, it is useful to know how quickly it
converges to good solutions. Fig. 4 plots the probability of ﬁnding a completely correct
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Fig. 2. Probability of correctly translating every element in one system to every element in a second system, as a
functionofthe numberofitemspersystem, andthe amountofnoisewithwhichthe elementsofthe secondsystem
are displaced relative to their positions in the ﬁrst system. For this simulation, the number of dimensions deﬁning
each element is 2, r ¼ 2, number of iterations ¼ 4000, and b ¼ 0:4. In this graph, as well as all others, standard
error bars are smaller than the height of the legend symbols.translation as a function of the number of items per system and the number of iterations of
Eq. (1). By 4000 iterations, ABSURDIST’s performance has attained nearly asymptotic
levels, and reasonably good levels of performance are found with 1000 and 2000 itera-
tions. One attractive feature of the algorithm shown in Fig. 4 is that the number of
iterations required for good performance is not appreciably affected by the number of
items per system. However, the number of network units required by the algorithm does
increase as a quadratic function of the number of items per system because N
2 correspon-
dence units are required for aligning two systems with N items per system.
Fig. 2 shows the robustness of ABSURDIST in the face of noise resulting from displa-
cements of elements across systems. As applied to conceptual systems, this corresponds to
two people having corresponding concepts, but having somewhat different knowledge
associated with the concepts. A more challenging situation arises if people do not have
the same set of concepts at all. One possibility is that one system has more concepts than
the other. When different-sized systems are compared, ABSURDIST’s correspondences
are still typically one-to-one, but not all elements of the larger system are placed in
correspondence. This situation is shown in Fig. 5A, in which System A has three elements
and System B has seven elements, three of which are arranged in the same conﬁguration as
those in System A. Given the parameters used thus far, ABSURDIST correctly places the
elements from System A into correspondence with the three-element pattern contained
within the larger seven-element pattern. In this fashion, ABSURDIST provides an algo-
rithm for ﬁnding patterns concealed within larger contexts.
A particularly challenging situation for ABSURDIST occurs if two systems have the
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Fig. 3. Frequency distributions, out of 1000 tests, associated with different numbers of items and different
percentages of correctly translated items. The number of dimensions deﬁning each element is 2,
noise ¼ 0:3%, r ¼ 2, number of iterations ¼ 4000, and b ¼ 0:4.same number of elements, but only a subset of them properly matches. For example, Joan
and John both have concepts of Mushroom, Fungus, and Spores, but only Joan has a
concept of Trufﬂe and only John has a concept of Morel. This situation is implemented in
Fig. 5B by having four elements per system, with three of the elements matching well
across the systems, but one element from each system having no strong correspondence in
the other system. This is challenging because ABSURDIST’s one-to-one mapping
constraint will tend to match two elements if neither participates in any other strong
correspondences. Despite this tendency, given the situation shown in Fig. 5B and the
previously used parameter values for a, b, and x, ABSURDIST will draw correspon-
dences between the three pairs of elements that share the majority of their roles in
common, but not between the fourth, mismatching elements. The unit that places the
mismatching elements into correspondence does receive excitation from the three units
that place properly matching elements into correspondence due to one-to-one mapping
consistency. However, the lack of similarity between the mismatching elements’ similar-
ity relations to other elements overshadows this excitation.
In sum, we have considered three ways of modeling what it means for people to have
different concepts. First, similarity relations among concepts may be different. Second,
one person may possess more concepts than another person. Third, each person may have
concepts that are unknown to the other person. In each of these cases, ABSURDIST can
translate between people and determine which concepts have corresponding concepts in
the other person and which concepts are untranslatable.
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Fig. 4. Probability of ABSURDIST achieving a perfect translation between two systems, as a function of the
number of iterations. Noise ¼ 0:3%, number of dimensions deﬁning each element ¼ 2, number of tests per
point ¼ 1000, r ¼ 2, and b ¼ 0:4.6.2. Indirect similarity relations
In ABSURDIST (when a ¼ 0), the cross-system correspondence between two elements
is based on their within-system similarity relations. However, if two elements within a
system enter into the same set of similarity relations, they still may be disambiguated. This
point is clariﬁed by the systems shown in Fig. 6. In System 1, there are two elements, Aand
E, that have the same set of dissimilarities, albeit reordered, to the other elements in
System 1. That is, both A and E have distances of 187, 333, 278, and 400 to the other
four units of System 1. System 2 is a rotation of System 1 in which A becomes V, B
becomes W, and so on. Given that A and E have the same within-system distance relations,
one might suspect that deciding whether A corresponds to V or Z of System 2 would be at
chance. However, ABSURDIST is able to determine the proper correspondences, shown
by the dotted lines, with perfect reliability.
The reason for this successful translation is that the all correspondences are worked out
simultaneously, and completely ambiguous correspondences can be disambiguated by
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Fig. 5. Two examples of ABSURDIST translating only parts of a system, with typical alignments shown by a
solid line connecting elements across the systems. (A) The pattern represented by System 1 is aligned with the
subsystem of System 2 that optimally matches this pattern. (B) The three pairs of elements that have mostly
comparable similarity relations within their systems are placed into correspondence, but a fourth element of each
system is not placed into any correspondence because it is too dissimilar to other elements in terms of its
similarity relations.other developing correspondences. Initially, the unit that places A into correspondence
with Z will be just as activated as the unit that places A into correspondence with V.
However, the identical distance between A and B from System 1 and X and Z from System
2 will not strengthen the A-to-Z correspondence much because within-system dissimila-
rities will indicate that B corresponds best to W, not X. In general, the eventual correspon-
dence strength between two elements will be based not only on their direct similarity
relations to other elements, but also on indirect relations among other elements. That is,
whether A corresponds to V depends not only on how similar A and V are to other elements
in their systems, but it also depends, for example, on how similar B is to C. Analogs of this
effect can be found in lexical semantics (Landauer & Dumais, 1997), the interpretation of
neural networks (Laakso & Cottrell, 2000), the phenomenology of color perception (Clark,
2000; Palmer, 1999), similarity judgments (Shepard, 1962), and object recognition (Edel-
man, 1999). In each of these domains, a multi-element, complex system provides many
direct and indirect constraints that can determine proper translations across systems. This
is part of the reason why increasing the number of items per system generally increases
rather than decreases the quality of a translation.
6.3. Integrating internal and external determinants of conceptual correspondences
Thus far, translations have been completely based on within-system relations. The
simulations have indicated that within-system relations are sufﬁcient for discovering
between-system translations, but this should not be interpreted as suggesting that the
meaning of an element is not also dependent on relations extrinsic to the system. ABSUR-
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Fig. 6. The horizontal and vertical coordinates for each element of System 1 are shown next to it, and System 1 is
rotated clockwise to obtain the elements of System 2. The correct translation (shown by the dashed lines) between
Systems 1 and 2 is reliably found by ABSURDIST even though elements A and E enter into the same four within-
system distancerelationships. ElementsA and V, and elements E and Z, are properlyaligned becauseofthe roleof
indirect, within-system similarity relations on translation.DIST offers a useful, idealized system for examining interactions between intrinsic
(within-system) and extrinsic (external to the system) aspects of meaning. One way to
incorporate extrinsic biases into the system is by initially seeding correspondence units
with values. Thus far, all correspondence units have been seeded with initial activation
values tightly clustered around 0.5. However, in many situations, there may be external
reasons to think that two elements correspond to each other: they may receive the same
label, they may have perceptual attributes in common, they may be associated with a
common event, or a teacher signal may have provided a hint that the two elements
correspond. In these cases, the initial seed value may be signiﬁcantly greater than 0.5.
Fig. 7 shows the results of a simulation of ABSURDIST with different amounts of
extrinsic support for a selected correspondence between two elements. Two systems are
generated by randomly creating a set of points in two dimensions for System 1, and
copying the points’ coordinates to System 2 while introducing 0.6% noise to their posi-
tions. When Seed ¼ 0:5, then no correspondence is given an extrinsically supplied bias.
When Seed ¼ 0:75, then one of the true correspondences between the systems is given a
larger initial activation than the other correspondences. When Seed ¼ 1:0, this single
correspondence is given even a larger initial activation. Somewhat unsurprisingly, when
a true correspondence is given a relatively large initial activation, then ABSURDIST
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Fig. 7. Percentage of correct alignments found by ABSURDIST, as a function of the number of items per system,
and the amount of external bias that seeds a single correct alignment between two elements. As the strength of
external bias increases, the percentage of correct correspondences increases, and this increase exceeds the
increase predicted if seeding one alignment only affected the alignment itself (the “Reference” line). As such,
the inﬂuence of extrinsic information is accentuated by within-system relations. Noise ¼ 0:6%, number of
dimensions deﬁning each element ¼ 2, number of tests per point ¼ 1000, number of iterations ¼ 4000, r ¼ 2,
and b ¼ 0:4.recovers a higher percentage of correct correspondences. The extent of this improvement
is more surprising. For example, for a system made up of 15 elements, a mapping accuracy
of 31% is obtained without any extrinsic assistance (Seed ¼ 0:5). If seeding a single
correct correspondence with a value of 1 rather than 0.5 allowed ABSURDIST to recover
just that one correspondence with 100% probability, then accuracy would increase at most
to 35.6% (((0.31 £ 14) 1 1)/15). The reference line in Fig. 7 shows these predicted
increases in accuracy. For all systems tested, the observed increment in accuracy far
outstretches the increase in accuracy predicted if seeding a correspondence only helped
that correspondence. Moreover, the amount by which translation accuracy improves
beyond the amount predicted generally increases as a function of system size. Thus,
externally seeding a correspondence does more than just ﬁx that correspondence. In a
system where correspondences all mutually depend upon each other, seeding one corre-
spondence has a ripple-effect through which other correspondences are improved.
Although external and role-based accounts of meaning have typically been pitted against
each other, it turns out that the effectiveness of externally grounded correspondences is
radically improved by the presence of role-based correspondences.
Eq. (2) provides a second way of incorporating extrinsic inﬂuences on correspondences
between systems. This equation deﬁnes the net input to a correspondence unit as an
additive function of the extrinsic support for the correspondence, the intrinsic support,
and the competition against it. Thus far, the extrinsic support has been set to 0. The
extrinsic support term can be viewed as any perceptual, linguistic, or top-down informa-
tion that suggests that two objects correspond. For example, two people using the same
verbal label to describe a concept could constitute a strong extrinsic bias to place the
concepts in correspondence. To study interactions between extrinsic and intrinsic support
for correspondences, we conducted 1000 simulations that started with ten randomly placed
points in a two-dimensional space for System A, and then copied these points over to
System B with Gaussian-distributed noise. The intrinsic, role-based support is determined
by the previously described equations. The extrinsic support term of Eq. (2) is given by
EðAq;BxÞ¼e
2DðAq;BxÞ
where D is the Euclidean distance function between point q of System A and point x of
System B. This equation mirrors the exponential similarity function used to determine
intrinsic similarities, but now compares absolute coordinate values. Thus, the correspon-
dence unit connecting q and x will tend to be strengthened if q and x have similar
coordinates. This is extrinsic support because the similarity of q’s and x’s coordinates
can be determined without any reference to other elements. If the two dimensions reﬂect
size and brightness, for example, then for q and x to have similar coordinates would mean
that they have similar physical appearances along these perceptual dimensions.
In conducting the present simulation, we assigned three different sets of weights to the
extrinsic and intrinsic support terms. For the “Extrinsic only” results of Fig. 8, we set
a ¼ 0:4, b ¼ 0, and x ¼ 0:6. For this group, correspondences are only based on the
extrinsic similarity between elements. For the “Intrinsic only” results, we set a ¼ 0,
b ¼ 0:4, and x ¼ 0:6. This group is comparable to the previous simulations in that it
uses only a role-based measure of similarity to establish correspondences. Finally, for
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spondences are based on both absolute coordinate similarity and on elements taking part in
similar relations to other elements. Note that both the intrinsic and extrinsic terms are
based on the same coordinate representations for elements. The difference between these
terms centers on whether absolute or relative coordinate values are used.
Fig. 8 shows that using only information intrinsic to a system results in better corre-
spondences than using only extrinsic information. This is because corresponding elements
that have considerably different positions in their systems can often still be properly
connected with intrinsic information if other proper correspondences can be recovered.
The intrinsic support term is more robust than the extrinsic term because it depends on the
entire system of emerging correspondences. For this reason, it is surprising that the best
translation performance is found when intrinsic and extrinsic information are both incor-
porated into Eq. (2). The superior performance of the network that uses both intrinsic and
extrinsic information derives from its robustness in the face of noise. Some distortions to
points of System Badversely affect the intrinsic system more than the extrinsic system. For
example, a slight distortion to a point may make its pattern of distances to other points
quite similar to another point. This will present difﬁculties to the intrinsic system, but will
not necessarily affect the extrinsic system at all. A set of distortions may have a particu-
larly disruptive inﬂuence on either absolute coordinates or relative positions. A system that
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Fig. 8. Probability of ABSURDIST achieving a perfect translation between two systems, as a function of noise,
and the weighting of extrinsic and intrinsic information. Better performance is achieved when all weight is given
to intrinsic information than when only extrinsic information is used. However, the best performance is achieved
whenboth sourcesof information are weightedequally. Numberof items per system ¼ 10, number ofdimensions
deﬁning each element ¼ 2, number of tests per point ¼ 1000, number of iterations ¼ 4000, r ¼ 2, and
a 1 b ¼ 0:4.incorporates both sources of information will tend to recover well from either disruption if
the other source of information is reasonably intact.
7. Discussion of simulations
The ABSURDIST model makes two theoretically important points. First, translations
between two systems can be found using only information about the relations between
elements within a system. This general claim can be applied to the particular issue of
identifying identical concepts across two different people. The claim is that the concept in
Person A that matches a concept in Person B can be found considering only the relations
between concepts in Person A, and the relations between concepts in Person B. ABSUR-
DIST’s account of meaning, impoverished though it is, is based solely on the role of a
concept within its system (when a ¼ 0). ABSURDIST demonstrates how a holistic
conception of meaning is compatible with the goal of determining correspondences
between concepts across individuals. Two people need not have exactly the same systems,
or even the same number of concepts, to create proper conceptual correspondences. Contra
Fodor (Fodor, 1998; Fodor & Lepore, 1992), information in the form of inter-conceptual
similarities sufﬁces to ﬁnd inter-system equivalences between concepts. In ABSURDIST,
two concepts are treated as matching if the correspondence unit that connects them has an
activation greater than a threshold value, and given the positive feedback inherent in the
algorithm, correspondence units typically converge rapidly to either 0 or 1.
The simulations identify several speciﬁc characteristics of the process of conceptual
web-based translation. First, in many cases it is easier to ﬁnd translations for large systems
than small systems. This is despite two large disadvantages for systems comprising many
elements: there are relatively many opportunities to get the cross-system alignments
wrong, and the elements tend to be close together and hence confusable. The powerful,
compensating advantage of many-element systems is that the roles that an object plays
within a system are more elaborated and distinctive as the number of elements in the
system increases. Second, as exempliﬁed by Fig. 6, an algorithm that uses a concept’s role
within a system to determine its proper translation can still distinguish between concepts
that have the same overall set of relations to other concepts. This is achieved by using
indirect relations. The translation for concept X is based not only on X’s relations, but also
on Y’s relation to Z, assuming that X, Y, and Z belong to the same system. Third, the
particular algorithm presented converges relatively quickly on a cross-system translation,
and the convergence time does not depend much on the size of systems being aligned. The
number of nodes does increase quadratically with the number of elements per system, but
this can be reduced by only building correspondence units for alignments that have initial
support above a threshold level (Goldstone, 1998), or by using dynamic binding operations
to represent correspondences (Hummel & Holyoak, 1997).
The second important theoretical contribution of ABSURDIST is to formalize some of
the ways that intrinsic, within-system relations and extrinsic, perceptual information
synergistically interact in determining conceptual alignments. Intrinsic relations sufﬁce
to determine cross-concept translations, but if extrinsic information is available, more
robust, noise-resistant translations can be found. Moreover, extrinsic information, when
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this is that providing an extrinsic bias to align two concepts improves translation for more
than just this pair of concepts. The beneﬁcial ripple-effect for seeding one alignment
increases with the number of elements in the system. The relations within a system
amplify the effect of extrinsic information. The second evidence is that better alignments
are found when both extrinsic and intrinsic information is used than when either source of
information is exclusively used, even when the total amount of information is equated.
The synergistic beneﬁt of combining intrinsic and extrinsic information sheds new light
on the debate on accounts of conceptual meaning. It is common to think of intrinsic and
extrinsic accounts of meaning as being mutually exclusive, or at least zero-sum. In philo-
sophy, the debate on conceptual meaning has been framed in terms of whether concepts
gain their meaning from their role in a system or their external grounding. By this framing,
conceptual web accounts of meaning seem opposed to externally grounded accounts.
Seemingly, either a concept’s meaning depends on information within its conceptual
system or outside of its conceptual system, and to the extent that one dependency is
strengthened, the other dependency is weakened.
In opposition to this zero-sum perspective on intrinsic and extrinsic meaning, ABSUR-
DIST offers a framework in which a concept’s meaning is both intrinsic and extrinsically
determined, and the external grounding makes intrinsic information more, not less, power-
ful. An advantage of this approach to conceptual meaning is that it avoids an infelicitous
choice between reducing conceptual meanings to sense data and leaving conceptual
systems completely ungrounded. Taking the concept Car as an example, we need not
claim that car’s meaning is completely exhausted by perceptually available data (e.g. a car
is composed of tires, seats, and an engine, and tires are composed of wheels and hubcaps,
and wheels are composed of …). A concept’s meaning may also depend on concepts at the
same level of abstraction (bus and truck), and higher levels of abstraction (car is not only
characterized by engine, but it also serves to characterize engine). Yet, perceptual infor-
mation, when provided, can be an integral part of the concept. To claim that all concepts in
a system depend on all of the other concepts in a system is perfectly compatible with
claiming that all of these concepts have a perceptual basis. These two bases of meaning are
mutually reinforcing, not mutually exclusive.
8. Conclusions
With respect to the application of ABSURDIST to conceptual systems, we agree with
Fodor (1998) that concepts should be shareable. An account of concepts needs to provide a
way of saying that John’s and Joan’s Mushroom concepts correspond to one another
despite their different knowledge about Mushrooms and Tapioca. Without this corre-
spondence, John and Joan would not be able to achieve communicative contact with one
another. They would no longer feel that they are thinking and talking about the same thing.
Where we disagree with Fodor is on the question of whether this impression of thinking
about the same thing requires literal identity between John’s and Joan’s concepts. Accord-
ing to Fodor, “to say that two people share a concept (i.e. that they have literally the same
concept) is thus to say that they have tokens of literally the same concept type” (p. 28). In
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to determine matching, and hence shared, concepts across systems.
The advantage of accounting for shared concepts in terms of correspondence rather than
identity is that one avoids the uncomfortable conclusion that people with demonstrably
different knowledge associated with something have the identical concept of that thing.
Although the notion of correspondence is less restrictive than identity, it is more
constrained than similarity. Many concepts may be similar to each other, but in ABSUR-
DIST one concept in System A typically corresponds to at most one concept from System
B. Unlike the completely graded notion of similarity, correspondences in ABSURDIST
become all-or-none after a modest number of iterations. This all-or-none nature of corre-
spondences explains our inclination to say that two people have the same concept, and that
slight differences in the persons’ knowledge do nothing to affect this claim. Joan’s and
John’s Mushroom concepts are placed into complete correspondence with one another
even if only Joan knows that mushrooms come from spores. Despite this difference in
gradedness between similarity and correspondence, it is nonetheless true that correspon-
dences are determined by similarities between concepts across systems. In turn, the simi-
larity of concepts across systems can be based solely on the concepts’ similarities to other
concepts within their system. Even if two systems have different relations between corre-
sponding concepts (Figs. 1 and 2), different numbers of concepts (Fig. 5A), or a subset of
concepts with no correspondences (Fig. 5B), it is often still possible to recover the correct
translation between the conceptual systems using this completely within-system relational
information.
Our claim is not that translation between large systems should or typically does proceed
using only within-system relations. To the contrary, our simulations point out the power of
combining intrinsic, within-system relations and extrinsic grounding. The simulations that
did involve only within-system relations indicate that relations intrinsic to a system are an
effective component for identifying and translating elements within the system, and that
this efﬁcacy does not require extrinsic grounding. Conceptual web accounts of meaning
can offer an account of some aspects of meaning, even though they are most effective
when combined with an externally grounded component. Thus, a system in which the
meanings of its elements all depend upon each other is not viciously circular. A system’s
elements do not need to be grounded in something outside of the system for proper
correspondences between the system’s elements and elements outside of the system to
be formed. The notion that the meaning of an element within a system, and a component of
its meaning that transcends the system, can emerge from its relations to other elements in
the system need not be an ABSURDIST fantasy.
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